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1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
“You can have a Lord, you can have a King, but the man to fear is the tax collector”1 – should this 
statement echo any fears for the receiver of a lobolo payment? 
 
If the receiver of a lobolo payment is obliged to pay tax on such receipt it would mean more money 
in the ever needy coffers of the tax collector. “Lobolo is the compromised word decided for this 
research, which it is admittedly, a word of Nguni origin, it is none the less widely used in the lingua 
franca of Southern Africa and even beyond in the central and eastern Africa”.2 The South African 
tax collector is known as the South African Revenue Service (SARS) established in terms of the 
SARS Act.
3
 The SARS is entrusted with the responsibility of collecting revenue that is due
4
. On the 
other hand the taxpayers are always exploring new ways of structuring their tax affairs in order to 
reduce their tax liability. The question therefore is – should a lobolo payment be seen as a taxable 
event, and therefore a tax handle for SARS?   
 
2. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY  
 
The rationale of this research is to determine the tax effect of receiving a lobolo payment, if any. 
The lack of certainty in the treatment of receipt of a lobolo payment can be a significant challenge 
for SARS and taxpayers alike.  
 
3. RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
This study will research the question of whether the receipt of a lobolo payment attract tax 
consequences.    
                                            
1 Goldswain “The personal circumstance of the taxpayer as a defence or as a plea of “extenuating circumstances for the    
purposes of remission of penalties in income tax matters(2003)Meditari Accountancy Research Journal 11at 86. 
2 
Bennet Customary Law in Southern Africa (2004) 220. 
3
 Act 34 of 1997. 
4 
Act 34 of 1997, section 3(a). 
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4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The research methodology of this research will follow an analytical approach. Secondary data such 
as the South African legislative framework and the commentary thereon, court decisions, textbooks 
and opinions in articles will be analysed to determine the tax consequences of a lobolo payment in 
South Africa. As the aim of the research will be to determine the current status of such payments, 
the time horizon will be cross sectional. An applied method will be used to address the specified 
issues.  
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2. CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF A LOBOLO PAYMENT AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
FRAMEWORK 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the basic principles discussed in this research. This includes a 
discussion of the term customary law, the nature of a lobolo payment as well as a legislative 
overview. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a background for further chapters. Without this 
essential background some concepts that will be discussed will not be fully appreciated.  
 
2.  CUSTOMARY LAW 
 
The South African legal system consists of four spheres, namely - English law, Roman law, Dutch 
law and customary law.
5
 In the South African context, customary law is the law of the indigenous 
people which forms part of their tradition.
6
 Customary law is divided into two parts, the codified 
and the uncodified version. When the British took over from the Dutch in the Cape they decided to 
codify customary law. For the first time this led to the recognition of customary law.
7
 The codified 
version of customary law was known as the Natal Code of 1878. It was subsequently amended by 
the Natal Code of 1891, which was regarded as inert, because it failed to account for the dynamic 
nature of customary law.
8
 The application of customary law in South Africa differs from one region 
to the other - this was viewed as chaotic due to a lack of uniform way of application of customs. As 
a result the Black Administration Act
9
 was enacted, which attempted to codify customary law 
applied in the different regions in one document. Subsequent to this the Repeal of the Black 
Administration Act and Amendment of certain Laws Act was introduced,
10
 which gave customary 
law full recognition.   
 
                                            
5
 https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/customary-law-south-africa-historical-development-legal-system-and-its-relation-    
women (16-04-2019). 
6
 https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/customary-law-south-africa-historical-development-legal-system-and-its-relation 
women (16-04-2019). 
7
 https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/customary-law-south-africa-historical-development-legal-system-and-its-relation-
women  (16-04-2019). 
8
 https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/customary-law-south-africa-historical-development-legal-system-and-its-relatio 
women (16-04-2019). 
9 
Act 28 of 1927. 
10
Act 28 of 2005. 
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The recognition of customary law did not mean that all the principles of customary law were 
accepted without any limitations. Section 1(1) of the law of Evidence Amendment Act
11
 provided 
that, the application of customary law would only be applied subject to the repugnance clause
12
. 
The repugnance clause provided that Customary Law must only be applied if it is not opposed to 
the principles of public policy or natural justice. It also provided that, it shall not be permissible for 
any court to declare that the custom of lobolo or other similar custom as repugnant to such 
principles.
13
 
 
3. THE NATURE OF A LOBOLO PAYMENT AND WHAT IS LOBOLO IS MEANT TO 
EFFECT? 
 
Lobolo is sanctioned by the laws that regulates the aspects of customary law, such as Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act,
14
 the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act
15
 and the Natal Code of 
Zulu Law.
16
 
 In terms of section 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (Recognition Act),
17
 lobolo is 
defined as,  
 
“property in cash or in kind, whether known as lobolo, bogadi, bohali, xuma, lumalo, 
thaka, ikhazi, magadi, emabheka or by any other name, which a prospective husband 
or  the head of his  family undertakes to  give  to  the  head  of  the  prospective  
wife‟s  family  in  consideration  of  a  customary marriage” 
From the above definition of lobolo it is clear that lobolo my either be money or property. Adverse to 
the Roman-Dutch law, in customary law a contract is needed for the formation of a customary 
marriage. A contract relating to property in the form of cattle known as “ikazi” must be entered into 
between the family of the bride and the groom. This contract is known as a lobolo contract. In the 
lobolo contract property pass from the groom to the father of the bride.
18
 In Alexkor Ltd and Another 
                                            
11 
Act 45 of 1988. 
 
12 
South African Law Commission “Harmonisation of Common Law and the Indigenous” paper 4 Project 90 (1999)1-
113 13.
 
   
13 South African Law Commission “Harmonisation of Common Law and the Indigenous” paper 4 Project 90 (1999)1-
113 13.
 
   
14 
Act 45 of 1988.
 
   
15 
Act 120 of 1998.
 
   
16 
 Notice R151of 1987.
 
17 
Act 120 of 1998.
    
18
 Kerr Roman-Dutch Law Marriages and the Lobolo contract at 334 were the article begin. 
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v Richtersveld Community and Others,
19
 it was held that, “while in the past indigenous law was seen 
through the lens of common law, it must now be seen as an integral part of our law”. This simply 
means that the application of customary law is not subject to the standards of common law. As any 
other law in South Africa, customary law is only subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa
20
 (the Constitution). 
 
It is submitted that the purpose of lobolo is to compensate the parents of the bride, for the loss of their 
daughter, loss of her earning capacity, the money spent on her education and raising her.
21
 The notion 
at the foundation of lobolo is that the family suffers a loss by the marriage of a bride. The family is 
thus deprived of her assistance, and her family as a result have a just claim for compensation.
22 
Through lobolo the family of the groom is able to secure both production and reproduction from the 
gain of the bride. The family of the bride secure cattle, cash, land, and labour.
23
 For the purposes of 
this research, and in a nutshell, the central thrust of a lobolo payment is compensation for loss of a 
daughter. A lobolo payment is viewed as a transfer of wealth from the groom and/or his family to the 
family of the bride. In most of southern, central and eastern Africa, lobola was calculated in cattle 
even if payment was made in some other medium.
24
 The lobolo and   its legal consequences differ 
wholly from the common law contract of purchase and sale. The bride is not sold merely as a chattel, 
and the husband cannot resell her as such or destroy her as if she was his personal property.25 
 
 
4. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
Taxation is the vehicle which is utilised by the state to collect funds from persons for the purpose of 
funding its administration and the benefits that it offers to its citizen.
26
 In South Africa, income tax is 
imposed in terms of a statute known as the Income Tax Act (the Act).
27
 
 
                                            
19
 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) 463. 
20 Constitution of the Republic of South, 1996. 
21 
T W Benett a Sourcebook of Southern Africa (1
st
 ed) 201. 
22 
The nature and significance of bride wealth among South African Bantu (1984)1-105 82. 
23 Ansella “Renegotiating the Meaning of lobola in Southern African Secondary” 2001 JSA 698 716 specific reference     
    is to 698. 
24 
http://smu-facweb.smu.ca/~wmills/course316/14Status_women.html (03-05-2019) 
25
 S 107 (1) of  the Natal Code of Zulu Law, which provides expressly  that African women are  
not to be treated as chattels. 
26 
Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax (2018) 1. 
27
 Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax (2018) 5. 
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Section 5(1) of the Act,
28
  provides for the annual payment of tax which is referred to as normal tax. 
Normal tax is imposed upon persons regardless of whether they are natural persons, close 
corporations or other taxable entities, such as trust, deceased estate or insolvent estate.
29
 The general 
structure for purpose of determining of taxable income, predicates that the starting point in the 
income tax calculation is gross income.
30
 When a person does not have gross income, such a person 
is not liable for normal tax. The definition of gross income is one of the significant definitions in the 
Act. Gross income is defined in section 1 of the Act
31
 as follows: 
 
“Gross income”, “in relation to any year or period of assessment, means- 
(i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by 
or accrued to or in favour of a resident; or 
(ii) in the case of any person other than a resident ,the total amount, in cash or 
otherwise , received or accrued to or in favour of such person from a  source 
within the Republic, during such year or period of assessment, excluding 
receipts or accruals of a capital nature”……32 
The definition of gross income is structured in a manner, which implies that receipts or accruals that 
are not classified as gross income are automatically receipts or accruals of a capital in nature.
33 
Having regard to the above definition of gross income, it is evident that there are five essential 
component that must be fulfilled before an amount is regarded as income, and therefore taxable. 
These elements are: 
a) the total amount;  
b) in cash or otherwise; 
c) received by or accrued to, or in favour of, a person; 
d) from a South African source, in the case of a non-resident; and 
e) other than receipts or accruals of a capital nature.34  
 
                                            
28
 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
29
 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
30 
Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax (2018) 17. 
31
 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
32
 De Koker and Williams, Silke on South African Tax, volume 1 3-3. 
33 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
34
 Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax (2018) 17. 
- 7 - 
Excluding the terms “resident”, “year of assessment” in section 1,35 and “source” in section 9 of the 
Act, 
36
the other elements in the definition of gross income are not defined. Therefore in order to 
determine whether an amount is gross income or not, reference has to be made to the decided 
cases.
37
  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
This chapter established that, for purposes of this research, a lobolo payment is essentially a 
compensation payment for loss of a daughter. Furthermore, the receipt of such payment must meet 
the requirements as dictated by the definition of gross income. In order for the receipt of a lobolo to 
be taxable. Whether that is indeed the case will be explored in chapter 3 and 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
35 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
36 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 
37 
Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax (2018)19. 
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3. CHAPTER 3: REVENUE V CAPITAL AND APPLICATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE 
FRAMEWORK 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The previous chapter established that if a lobolo payment fulfil the requirements of the definition of 
gross income – such payment is taxable. For the purposes of this research it is accepted that a lobola 
payment meets the following requirements of the definition of gross income:  
 
a) that it is the total amount;  
b) in cash or otherwise; 
c) received by or accrued to, or in favour of, a person; and 
d) from a South African source.  
However, the question whether a lobolo payment is revenue or capital in nature cannot be accepted 
and remains unanswered and will be the focus of the remainder of this research.  
 
2. INTRODUCTION TO THE TERMS REVENUE AND CAPITAL  
 
The distinction between revenue and capital is a significant one for the purpose of income tax. In 
terms of the Act receipts or accruals of a capital nature are excluded from the definition of gross 
income. Receipts or accruals of a capital nature are not subject to income tax,
38
 but they are subject 
to Capital Gains Tax 
39 
(CGT), which is taxed at a lower effective tax rate.
40 
Receipt   or accrual of a 
capital nature are excluded from the definition of gross income- however the Act does not define 
the term of a “capital in nature”.   
 
The question of whether income is revenue or capital is both a matter of facts and law. As a result, 
court decisions are relied upon to determine whether income is revenue or capital.
41
 The large 
number of judicial decisions on the question of revenue or capital indicates that the expression of a 
                                            
38 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
39 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, schedule eighth paragraph 3. 
40 
Olivier “Capital v Revenue: Some guideline” 2012 De jure 172- 178 specific reference is to 172.  
41
 Williams Income Tax and Capital Gains in South Africa (3
rd
 ed) 51. 
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capital in nature is not specific. There is no single reliable test in determining whether the receipts 
or accruals is income or capital.
42
 
 
The distinction whether a receipt is income or capital is important, however the view that all 
receipts or accruals must either be identified as revenue or capital is unjustifiable, in that CGT is 
imposed on the disposal of an asset for proceeds more than its base cost.
43
 However in the case of 
Pyott Ltd v CIR, 
44
it was held that, the deposits were not trust money. As a result they were not 
capital but income, in that there is no halfway house, a receipt is either income or capital.
45
 The 
contention that all receipts are either revenue or capital is questionable in that there is a third 
category, since in the hands of a debtor a loan is neither revenue nor capital. This however does not 
mean that the classification is insignificant. This is to outline the fact that in certain cases a receipt 
may neither be identified as revenue or capital.
46
 It is also possible that a single receipt can be 
assigned as revenue and capital. In the case of Tucker v CIR,
47
 it was held that: 
 
“in a proper case apportionment provide a sensible and practical solution to the problem 
which arises when a taxpayer receives a single receipt and the quid pro qou contains 
two or more separate elements , one or more of which would characterise it as capital. It 
could hardly have been the intention of the legislature that in such circumstances the 
receipt be regarded wholly as an income receipt, to the disadvantage of the taxpayer, or 
wholly as a capital receipt, to the detriment of the fiscus”. 
 
 
As mentioned, there is no single precise infallible test or rule that can be applied in all the cases 
when determining whether a receipt is revenue or capital. It seems that the legislature was aware of 
the difficulty of defining the terms revenue and capital.
48
     
 
In certain cases it is however easy to determine whether the proceeds are revenue or capital. This is 
in the cases were the taxpayer receives payment for allowing another person for the use of an asset. 
It is thus clear that, if payment is received for the right of use of an asset without exchange in 
                                            
42 De Koker and Williams, Silke on South African Tax, volume 1- 3.1.  
43
 Olivier “Capital v Revenue: Some guideline” 2012 De jure 172- 178 specific reference is to 172. 
44
 13 SATC 121. 
45 
13 SATC 121-126. 
46 
De Koker and Williams, Silke on South African Tax, volume 1 3-3 
47 50 SACT 98-145. 
48 De Koker and Williams, Silke on South African Tax, volume 1 3-4 
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ownership of the asset, the proceeds received are income.
49
  In cases where it is not easy to 
determine whether the proceeds are income or capital, our courts takes into account certain factors 
in order to arrive at the conclusion. 
 
The recurrence or annuality of a receipt cannot be regarded as decisive element on the question of 
whether a receipt is income or capital. It is nevertheless a significant element that must be taken into 
account. If a receipt is an annuity in a true sense of the word, it must then be included in gross 
income in terms of para (1) in the definition of gross income in section 1 of the Act. In CIR v 
Watermayer,
50
 a yearly ex gratia amount was paid to the widow of the professor for the period of 
ten years after his death. It was held that a regular payment is not an annuity, save when the 
beneficiary has an enforceable right to more than one payment. The payment made to the widow of 
the deceased professor were made ex gratia  paid every year, without any obligation, each payment 
was a separate gift to the widow of the deceased professor at the discretion of the University.  The 
amount were thus capital and as a result not taxable.
51
 
 
In the foreign jurisdiction in Federal Commissioner of Taxation Amount v Dixon 
52
 it was held that 
“[t]he periodicity regularity and recurrence of a receipt has been considered to be a hallmark of its 
character as income within the ordinary concepts and usages of mankind”.   The court held that 
receipt received for services rendered are regarded as income.  
 
On the other hand accidental agreement, such as lump-sum legacies and gifts, and lottery, betting or 
sweepstake wins, are of a capital in nature, and fall outside of the definition of gross income. The 
receipts which are received from the sale of an ordinary income producing investment or from the 
asset of a person who does not trade from such assets, for example private dwelling, painting or 
jewellery, are capital. On the other hand, if a taxpayer is in the business of buying and selling 
investments, houses, paintings and the jewellery, receipt received from these sales are gross income 
and subject to tax.
53
 What is the receipt of a capital in nature in the hands of one taxpayer can be 
income in the hands of another taxpayer.  
 
                                            
49 Juta‟s Income Tax: Revision Service 20, note for subscribers. 
50 1965 4 SA 431. 
51 1965 4 SA 431-436. 
52
 (1987) 163 CLR 199. 
53 De Koker and Williams, Silke on South African Tax, volume 1 3-3. 
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Establishing whether a receipt is revenue or capital is a factual exercise which considers takes all 
the pertinent facts. The inquiry takes into account the guidelines laid down in previous decisions, 
although these guidelines are of great assistance and are a useful tool in the course of getting to the 
decision, each case must nevertheless be decided on its own facts.
54
 
 
The question of whether a receipt is revenue or capital is succinctly captured in the following 
passage from the case of Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v SBI,
55
 Corbett JA: said the 
following: 
 
“Where a taxpayer sells property, the question as to whether the profits derived from the 
sale are taxable in his hands by reason of the proceeds constituting gross income or are 
not subject to tax because the proceeds constitute receipts or accruals of a capital nature, 
turns on the further enquiry as to whether the sale amounted to the realization of a 
capital asset or whether it was the sale of an asset in the course of carrying on a business 
or in pursuance of a profitmaking scheme. Where a single transaction is involved it is 
usually more appropriate to limit the enquiry to simple alternatives of a capital 
realization or a profitmaking scheme. In its normal and most straightforward form, the 
latter connotes the acquisition of an asset for the purpose of reselling it at a profit. This 
profit is then the result of the productive turnover of the capital represented by the asset 
and consequently falls into the category of income. The asset constitutes in effect the 
taxpayer's stock in trade or floating capital. In contrast to this the sale of an asset 
acquired with a view to holding it, either in a non-productive state or in order to derive 
income from the productive use thereof, and in fact so held, constitutes a realization of 
fixed capital and the proceeds an accrual of a capital nature. In the determination of the 
question into which of these two classes a particular transaction falls, the intention of 
the taxpayer, both at the time of acquiring the asset and at the time of its sale, is of great, 
and sometimes decisive, importance. Other significant factors include, inter alia, the 
actual activities of the taxpayer in relation to the asset in question, the manner of its 
realization, the taxpayer's other business operations (if any) and, in the case of a 
company, its objects as laid down in its memorandum of association. The aforegoing 
principles are trite and require no supportive citation of authority. They have been stated 
                                            
54
 De Koker and Williams, Silke on South African Tax, volume 1 3-5. 
55 39 SACT 163. 
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and restated, in various forms, by this court on numerous occasions. While the normal 
type of profitmaking scheme, relating to the acquisition and subsequent sale of an asset, 
contemplates a continuing and unchanging purpose from acquisition to sale, the courts 
have recognized the possibility of an intervening change of purpose or intention. Thus, 
an asset may have been acquired with the intention of reselling it at a profit but 
thereafter the owner's intention may change and he may decide to hold it as an income 
producing capital asset or investment. If, while this latter purpose persists, the asset is 
realized, this change of intention would be a strong indication that it was a capital 
realization and that the proceeds would be non-taxable”.56 
 
 
In conclusion, from the discussion above it is clear that determining whether or not a receipt is 
capital or revenue is of importance to both the taxpayer and SARS as it could ultimately attract tax. 
Further, it can be seen that this very important question does not come with a tailor made answer. 
This will be discussed further below.    
 
3. REVENUE V CAPITAL 
 
3.1 Fruit and tree analogy  
 
In terms of this theory, the receipts, which are due to the disposal of an income-producing asset (i.e. 
tree), are regarded as receipt of a capital nature. However in a case were an amount symbolises the 
fruit of the tree, the amount is not receipt of a capital nature, but revenue.
57
    
This theory was clearly elucidated in the case of Visser v CIR,
58
 in which it was held that: 
 
“Income is what capital produces, or is something in the nature of interest or fruit as 
opposed to principal or tree. This economic distinction is a useful guide in matters of 
income tax, but its application is often a matter of great difficulty, for what is a principal 
or tree in the hands of one man may be interest or fruit in the hands of another. Law 
                                            
56
 39 SACT 163 180-181. 
57 De Koker and Williams, Silke on South African Tax, volume 1-13. 
58 1937 TPD 77.  
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book in the hands of a lawyer are a capital asset, in the hands of a bookseller they are a 
trade asset”.59 
 
While it is clear that the tree signifies capital and the fruit signifies income, it is however not an 
easy task to decide when an amount represent the tree and when it represent a fruit.
60
 In the case of 
Visser v CIR 
61
  the taxpayer was a retired medical practitioner and a politician.  The taxpayer had 
secured mining options in the district of Bethal, but these options had since elapsed. The taxpayer 
had great influence in the area in his person and through his contacts. A company by the name of K 
decided to float a company in order to exploit mining possibility in the area. Because of the 
taxpayer‟s influence in the area, the taxpayer could have easily renewed the lapsed options. 
However, after agreeing with K he decided not to do so, in return shares were allotted to the 
taxpayer in respect of the service that the taxpayer rendered, and those he will be rendering.  In the 
Special court, the taxpayer argued that the shares received were receipt of a capital in nature. The 
court held that, the first question that the court has to ask itself is why the taxpayer received the 
shares? Because it was clear that, he did not receive them as a gift. 
 
The court held that the taxpayer could not claim that he sold his own right to compete for the 
options with the company known as Kpnek. In that the right of the taxpayer was more of a potential, 
rather than a clear right, as such, the law is not concerned with abstract rights. 
 
The court concluded that the taxpayer was aware that his influence in Bethal district had a 
marketable value.  The taxpayer used that to bargain successfully, as a result the shares received by 
the taxpayer were not because of the sale of a capital asset, but were as a result of the taxpayer 
using the advantage of being the first one in the field. The shares received by the taxpayer were the 
product of his energy and wit, as such they are revenue.
62
  
 
 
 
 
                                            
59 
1937 TPD 77-276. 
60 De Koker and Williams, Silke on South African Tax, volume 1- para -14.  
61
 1937 TPD 77- 81. 
62
 1937 TPD 77- 82. 
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3.2 Fixed and floating capital  
 
If any amount is received from the sale of a fixed asset, the proceeds derived are regarded as receipt 
of a capital in nature. Whilst proceeds which are received from the disposal of a floating asset is 
deemed to be revenue.
63
   
 
In the case of George Timber Co Ltd v CIR,
64
  the question was whether the taxpayer was entitled to 
deduct from the proceeds of its sale of its timber, an amount representing equivalent of the capital 
invested, which was lost when the timber was worked up.
65
 The question was, whether money 
received for the sawn timber is revenue or capital.
66
 The court held that the land was purchased with 
a prized forest in it, it was acquired for the purpose of obtaining revenue from it, which was felling, 
working–up and then selling the timber. There is no doubt that the trees were the most prized item 
of the property and it was the trees which inspired the acquisition.
67
 
 
Expenses incurred in the creation or acquisition of an income producing concern is regarded as a 
capital expenditure.  Such investment is made for the purpose of producing future wealth, while the 
outlay does not reappear, the income does. There is a significant difference between money invested 
for creating or acquiring a source of profit, and money utilised in producing it. While the former is 
capital expenditure, the latter is not.
68
  
 
 It was held that there is a fundamental difference between fixed and floating capital, in that floating 
capital is consumed or disappear during the processes of production, while fixed capital retain its 
character and produces fresh wealth.
69
 In this case the court said that the proceeds were revenue not 
capital. 
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3.3 Profit making scheme test  
 
In applying this test, the first question is whether the taxpayer objectively conducted business and 
secondly, was it the objective of the taxpayer to conduct business. The first question of the test must 
be objectively determined, this means looking at the facts of each case in order to establish whether 
a business was carried on, and that the amount that was received was received in the ordinary cause 
of business.
70
  
 
The leading authority in this regard is CIR V Pick- ‘n-Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust.71 In this 
case, it was held that, it was a well-recognised principle that receipts accruing to the Trust will be 
revenue if they represent a “gain made by an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for 
profit–making”.  However, receipt or accruals will not be regarded as income if they are not 
received from “an operation of business in carrying out a scheme for profit-making”. It is further 
significant to mention that there is a difference between the term carrying out a scheme of profit 
making” and “carrying on of a business”. The difference is that in the case of carrying out a scheme 
of profit making there is only one transaction involved, whereas in the case of carrying on a 
business there a multiple transactions involved. Regardless of the number of the transaction 
involved, the question whether proceeds are revenue or capital, still depends on whether the 
business was operated with a profit making purpose, i.e. as part of a profit–making venture or 
scheme.
72 
 In this case it was held that, the trust was not trading
73
.  
The court  emphasised that, one need not to only concentrate on the activities of the trust, but 
attention should also be given to the larger scheme in which the activities is part of. The court said 
that profit was not the motive of the trust. The trust operated under strict rules, which are normally 
not applicable in the normal share-dealing business the buying and selling of shares was not made 
in relation to market conditions, the trust bought shares which were forfeited, or shares offered to 
them by the participants. The trust could only sell the shares to the class of people envisaged in the 
terms of the trust.
74
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The court held that the receipt received by the Trust were not intentionally worked for, but they 
were just an accidentally by-product. As a result, they were not revenue, which means they are 
capital and fall outside the definition of gross income in the Act.
75
 
In the case of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Volkswagen of SA (Pty) Ltd,
76
 the court held that 
the reason for the acquisition as well as the disposal of the asset is a relevant factor that must be 
taken into account, looking at the business of the taxpayer and reason for the disposal of the asset. It 
was held that on the evidence presented before the court, it was clear that the leasing scheme was 
not considered by the company as a profit making scheme operated in accordance within the 
accepted   commercial lines.
 It was rather intended to benefit the taxpayers‟ employees as part of 
their remuneration package.
77
   
 
It was further highlighted that the leasing scheme was not making any profit for the company, but 
was operated at a loss, and attempts to discontinue it were met with resistance from the employees‟ 
representatives. The scheme was only operated as a public relation exercise in order to end an 
impasse between the employer and the employee representatives.
78
  The court held that the position 
of the taxpayer does not change because the equipment in question is the commodity in which the 
taxpayer trades. For example a manufacture of computer requires computers to conduct his 
business. In any business any equipment used in the production of business must be replaced from 
time to time. As a result a capital asset does not change its character from capital to revenue when it 
is replaced and sold.
79
 In this case it was held that the motor vehicles in question were a capital 
asset not revenue.  
 
The above-mentioned guideline considers certain factors in order to illustrate that the proceeds are 
income or capital. When applying this test, the court objectively investigate whether the taxpayer is 
involved in a scheme of profit-making, by taking into account the surrounding circumstances. The 
court look at the number of transaction involve, whether strict business rules were applied by the 
taxpayer and whether profit was the intention of the taxpayer and whether profit was it worked for 
or sought by the taxpayer.  
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3.4 Intention of the taxpayer 
 
Intention is another test that is used by the court in determining whether a receipt is revenue or 
capital. It is trite law that the test of intention is subjective.
80
 This means an attempt to understand 
the thoughts of a taxpayer when the transaction was concluded. A subjective test present a risk in 
that it is about the taxpayers own intention and his trustworthiness is taken into account by the 
court, because of the subjectivity, self-interest, the uncertainties of recollection and the chance of 
reconstruction by the taxpayer. The taxpayers‟ evidence is thus tested against surrounding facts and 
circumstances to determine the taxpayers‟ intention.81   
In Income Tax case no 1279,
82
 it was held that: 
“It is necessary to bear in mind that the ipse dixit of the taxpayer as to his intent and 
purpose should not lightly be regarded as decisive. It is the function of the court to 
determine on an objective review of all the relevant facts and circumstances what the 
motive, purpose and intention of the taxpayer were. Not the least important of the facts 
will be the course of conduct of the taxpayer in relation to the transaction in issue, the 
nature of his business or occupation and the frequency or otherwise of his past 
involvement or participation in similar transaction. The facts in regard to those matters 
will form an important part of the material from which the court will draw its own 
inference against the background of the general human and business probabilities. This 
is not to say that the court will give little or no weight to what the taxpayer says his 
intention was, as is sometimes contended in argument on behalf of the Secretary in case 
of this nature. The evidence of the taxpayer under oath and that of his witness must 
necessarily be given full consideration and credibility must be assessed as in any other 
case which comes before the court .But direct evidence of the intent and purpose must 
be weighed and tested against the probabilities and inferences normally to be drawn 
from the established facts”.83 
 
An analysis of decided cases does not offer a clear direction on whether it is the intention, object, 
motive or contemplation of the taxpayer, which must be taken into account. These words are rather 
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used alternative by the courts. In truth the words intention and object means what a person does. On 
the other hand motive means why a person acted in a particular way. Contemplation means whether 
a person anticipated a particular conclusion.
84
  
 
An examination of decided cases indicates that the intention of the taxpayer is an important factor, 
but not the only factor that must be taken into account. Intention is a significant factor that must be 
considered, but it must be considered with all the relevant factors.
85
  
  
In the case of SIR v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd
86
 it was held that: 
 
“[i]n an inquiry as to the intention with which a transaction was entered into for the 
purpose of the law of income tax, a court of law is not concerned with the kind of 
subjective state of mind required for the purposes of criminal law, but rather with the 
purpose for which the transaction was entered into”.87 
 
In order to establish the object of the scheme, one has to take into account the purpose or 
intention, which will show the reason for entering into the arrangement.
88
Although there is no 
recognition that is given to the motive of the taxpayer, however the intention of a person does 
not always reflect the person ipse dixit.
89
   
 
In Lace Proprietary Mines v CIR,
90
 the court held that the intention of the taxpayer was not a 
decisive factor, it must be considered together with all relevant factors. In this case it was held 
that the taxpayer was involved in the scheme of profit making by buying and selling mining 
mineral rights. Even though the taxpayer contended that the land was acquired for the purpose 
of conducting mining. The company has never conducted any mining operations in any of its 
land. The court held that the facts of the case strongly indicates, that the mining rights were 
held with the purpose of resale at the profit. As a result the profit were correctly held to be 
taxable.
91
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In CIR v Stott,
92
 the court held that the intention of the taxpayer is a significant factor, save if 
other intervening factors indicates that the article was sold in fulfilment of a profit making 
scheme.
93
 
 
The above mentioned cases illustrate the fact that, the intention of the taxpayer is not the only 
decisive factor that must be taken into account, it is rather one of the factors that must be 
considered when determining whether a receipt is income or capital. The cases further 
illustrate that in determining the intention of the taxpayer an objective test must be 
considered. This is because a subjective test pose a risk in that it is about the taxpayers own 
intention.   
 
3.5 Income earning-structure  
 
A capital asset is essentially part of a permanent or long –term structure of the taxpayers‟ income 
producing activities. The test is the theory of the fruit and a tree comparison. This philosophy looks 
at the economic role played by the property in the taxpayer‟s income earning structure.94 For the 
purpose of this research it is significant to consider the principle of “income earning structure” in 
that this principle looks at the role played by the added asset in the taxpayers‟ income producing 
structure.  
 
Although some of the cases that are cited below deals with the question of whether the expenditure 
claimed by the taxpayer are to be regarded as part of the cost of performing the income-earning 
operations, which are deductible in terms of the Act or as part of the cost of establishing or 
improving or adding to the income earning plant or machinery, which are not deductible as they are 
deemed to be capital. It is however important to highlight that the principle is still the same. A 
perfect example is in the case of W J Fourie Beleggings v CSARS,
95
 where the court cited a passage 
from the case of Nchanga Consolidated Copper, Mines Ltd, v Commissioner of Taxes, a case which 
dealt with the question of whether expenses were deductible or not deductible, when the question in 
the case was whether the rights that flow from the contract were capital or revenue. 
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In WJ Fourie Beleggings v CSARS,
96
 the taxpayer conducted business as a hotelier. The so called 
“9/11” attack of the World Trade Centre in New York lead to the cancellation of a lucrative 
agreement the taxpayer had entered into a few months earlier.
97
 As a result of this cancellation, in 
full and final settlement of all the claims arising from the cancellation of the agreement, the 
taxpayer received compensation. In assessing taxpayers‟ tax liability the Commissioner, regarded 
the compensation received by the taxpayer as falling within the definition of gross income.
98
 The 
taxpayer objected to this, indicating that the compensation was an accrual or receipt of a capital in 
nature, not subject to tax.   
 
The taxpayer submitted that the terminated agreement amounted to an asset that formed part of its 
income –producing structure. As a result the compensation paid by Naschem had been paid for the 
loss or sterilization of an income earning asset and should be regarded as capital. The issue in this 
case was whether the collections of rights which the recipient enjoyed under the contract and which 
 the taxpayer received, is compensation for a capital asset.
99
  The Commissioner on the other hand 
contended the amount claimed by the taxpayer was for a loss of profit suffered as a result of early 
termination of the agreement, on receipt of this compensation, the compensation will be revenue. 
 
The court held that depending on the facts of each case, an amount received by the taxpayer as a 
compensation for the cancellation of the trading contract may be regarded as being of a capital 
nature. However the cases relied upon by the taxpayer do not take the taxpayers argument any far, 
in that in those cases the agreement in question, moreover the rights and obligations flowing from 
those agreement, were utilised by the taxpayer for the purpose of generating income. The court 
indicated that in the case of Taeuber v and Corssen (Pty) Ltd v Secretary for Inland Revenue
100
 
which is relied upon by the taxpayer, it was related to the taxpayers‟ right to freely trade and his 
business skills to produce income being sterilized.
101
 Another case is ITC 1341
102
 which the 
taxpayer submitted that it supports its argument that the contract entered with Naschem was part of 
its income earning structure.
103
 In the case of ITC 1341 various companies were contractual oblige 
                                            
96
 (168/08) 2009 ZASCA 37(31 March 2009). 
97
 (168/08) 2009 ZASCA 37(31 March 2009) para 1. 
98
 (168/08) 2009 ZASCA 37(31 March 2009).para 2. 
99
 (168/08) 2009 ZASCA 37(31 March 2009).para 9. 
100
 37 SACT 129. 
101
 (168/08) 2009 ZASCA 37(31 March 2009).para 13. 
102
 43 SACT 215 (T). 
103
 (168/08) 2009 ZASCA 37(31 March 2009).para 13. 
- 21 - 
to utilise the taxpayers‟ services when needed. This contract therefore forced the other parties to the 
contract to give all the work to the taxpayer from which taxpayer earned income. The court held 
that the hallmark of the contracts in the cases relied upon by the taxpayer, is that these contracts 
created income-producing opportunity for the taxpayer. These agreements were the tools used to 
produce income and they were correctly found to have been part of the taxpayers‟ income 
producing structure.
104
  The court held that the contract entered by the taxpayer did not operate as a 
means by which the taxpayer generated business or through which it acquired business or get 
opportunity from which to generate income. The agreement between the parties was nothing more 
than a mere memorial of their agreement. As much as the taxpayer was going to earn a lot of money 
from the agreement which was going to be a major source of its income during the period of the 
contract, this however did not make the agreement part of the income producing structure. The 
agreement was thus a product of the taxpayer income earning activities, not the tool by which it 
earned its income. 
105
  
 
In the case of Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Limited v Commissioner for SA Revenue
106
, the essence 
of the matter was whether the amount of R67 million received by the taxpayer was revenue or 
capital.
107
 The court held that the question that must be answered is whether the taxpayer was 
compensated for the capital value of the exclusive distribution right. If that is the case, the payment 
was thus paid as a compensation for the loss of a capital asset. The payment was meant to fill a hole 
in the taxpayers‟ income producing structure. However, if the payment was offered as a 
compensation for the loss of profits, it is revenue.
108
 The court borrowed from the decision of ITC 
1341(1980)
109
 and held that the question is whether a significant part of the income–producing 
structure of the taxpayer had been sterilized by the transaction. The court further borrowed from the 
English decision of Inland Revenue v Fleming & Co (Machinery) Ltd
110
 and held that; 
 
 “the sum received by the commercial firm as compensation for the loss sustained by the 
cancellation of a trading contract or the premature cancellation of an agency agreement may in the 
recipient‟s hands be regarded either as a capital receipt or a trading receipt forming part of the of the 
trading profit. It may be difficult to formulate a general principle by reference to which in all cases 
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the correct decision will be arrived at since in each case the question comes to one of circumstances 
and degree”.111 
The court held that the agreement of the parties provided that the payment of compensation was for 
the closure of the taxpayers‟ business in relation to the exercise of distribution rights (an asset). 
From the agreement there was no indication that the payment was related to loss of profit. There 
was further no suggestion that the agreement was in anyway simulated.  As such the receipt of R67 
million received by the taxpayer was deemed to be of a capital in nature.   
 
In the case of Income Tax Case No 1341(1980),
112
 A and B were both finance housing controlling 
entities. They were managing various entities and they were both operating a share-transfer 
department. An agreement was reached by A and B to merge their respective share-transfer 
department. Pursuant to this agreement a new company was formed in which A and B had shares. 
This agreement was entered into in order to attract business outside of A and B group.  
Later on B acquired control over another finance house C. As a result B informed A that it was 
withdrawing from the arrangement. In withdrawing from the arrangement B paid compensation to 
A.
113
 The issue in this case is whether the compensation received by A is revenue or capital. The 
court said that the question that must be asked is whether the compensation is intended to fill the 
hole in the profits of the taxpayer or on the other hand is meant to be compensation for the 
destruction, sterilization or impairment of the taxpayer‟s income-producing structure.114 The court 
indicated that the withdrawal of B had a potential of undermining the existence of A whole 
structure. Using the metaphor of a tree and the fruit, the court held that the withdrawal of B from the 
contract, chopped off an important limp of the fruit bearing tree. Moreover the incident was not in 
the normal operation of A‟s business.115 It was further submitted that it is not necessary that the 
entire income earning structure is destroyed or immobilised.
116
 The court concluded that the 
compensation received by A was a capital payment and not revenue in the hands of A. In relation to 
a lobolo transaction, it is the view of this research that, lobolo is a compensation for the significant 
limb of the fruit bearing tree which is chopped off. This is because all the family members are 
regarded as an essential limb of a fruit bearing tree in a customary set up.  
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In Palaborwa Mining Co Ltd v SIR,
117
  the essence of the case was whether an amount of which was 
incurred by the taxpayer for construction of a water barrage to supply the mine, is deductible as it 
was incurred in the production of the taxpayers‟ income. It was held that what need to be considered 
is the fact that the waterworks were not build in the taxpayers land. The taxpayer did not have any 
ownership to the waterworks nor any preferential supply of water. The barrage of water was going 
to be built by the Phalaborwa Water Board regardless of the intervention by the taxpayer.
118
  
 
An important factor in this case is that the expenditure in question did not create or preserve any 
right or asset in the hands of the taxpayer. The taxpayer did not create a new asset nor was there any 
new addition to the existing structure was created.
119
 The court said that the expenditure were 
incurred only for the concern to yield profit earlier, by ensuring that there was sufficient supply of 
water. As such the argument that the expenses were incurred to ensure that the machine or profit 
yielding structure was found to be more efficient is unsustainable.
120
 The court said the taxpayers 
expenses were closely related to its income earning structure.  
  
In CIR v African Oxygen Ltd, 
121
 the court said that the agreement in question guaranteed that the 
taxpayer is relieved of the competition.  In connection with the benefit acquired by the taxpayer, 
there was some sufficient permanency and substance unquestionably to conclude that the right 
received under the agreement, forms part of the capital asset of the taxpayer. It was held that prima 
facie, what is paid for a capital asset is a capital expenditure. This is because part of the agreement 
by the two parties, was that they will not compete with one another. The fact that the payment under 
the agreement were recurrent in nature cannot be an indication that they related to income rather 
than to capital.
122
  
 
Moreover proper analysis indicates that these expenses are not connected to the performance of any 
income producing operations.  It was further held that the fact that an expenditure on the income 
producing machine eliminates obstacles in the way of sale, by removing defects and ensuring that 
the item is more durable and useful, as that of the competitor, or the introduction of a new features 
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which makes the item more attractive, cannot change a capital asset into income expenditure. It was 
thus concluded that expenses was of a capital in nature.
123
  
 
In SIR v Cadac engineering,
124
 the taxpayer was the sole producer and seller of liquid gas cooking 
appliances in South Africa licenced under M brothers. A new competitor by the name of Home gas 
came into the industry and the taxpayer was convinced that Home gas was violating its registered 
design. At the behest of the taxpayer M brothers interdicted Home gas from dealing or 
manufacturing in its appliances. The application of the taxpayer for an interdict was dismissed by 
the Supreme Court of Appeal. The taxpayer duly compensated M brothers for the expenses incurred 
in bringing the interdict application. The taxpayer then sought to deduct this expense in terms of 
section 11(a) of the Income Tax Act.
125
 The court held that “the conclusion to be drawn from all 
these cases seems to be that the true nature of each transaction must be enquired into in order to 
determine whether the expenditure attached to it, is revenue or capital expenditure.
126
 To determine 
whether a receipt is revenue or capital is a matter of fact and the purpose of the expenditure is an 
important factor that must be taken into account. If it is incurred for the purpose of acquiring a 
capital asset for the business,
127
 it is a capital expenditure, even if it is paid in annual instalments, if 
on the other hand, it is in truth no more than part of the cost incidental to the performance of the 
income-producing operations, as distinguished from the equipment of the income-producing 
machine, then it is revenue expenditure, even if it is paid in a lump sum. 
 
The argument of the taxpayer was that, the payment did not add an asset or improvements to the 
income earning structure. The court however argued that the fact that the payment did not add any 
asset or improve the taxpayers earning structure does not resolve the inquiry. As a result each case 
must be decided on its facts.
128
 
  
The expenditure expended by the taxpayer was aimed at eliminating Home gas as a competitor and 
as a result extend its business or monopoly and thus protect its good will. The expenditure was thus 
aimed at extending the taxpayer business in that, the taxpayer wanted to have exclusive licence in 
producing and manufacturing liquid gas appliances. In certain circumstances a taxpayer will 
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eliminate a competitor by buying him out, there is no doubt that this expense is of a capital 
nature.
129
 In the current case the taxpayer wanted to eliminate its competitor through litigation. The 
method used in these circumstances is not conclusive. It is however accurate to indicate that 
regardless of the different methods used, the results are successful if this will extend the taxpayers‟ 
income-earning structure.  The court held that in considering the taxpayers operations, the expenses 
incurred does not look like the cost of performing the taxpayers operations.
130
  In order for expenses 
to qualify for deduction they must be closely linked to the taxpayers operations, in other way the 
expenses must be the concomitant of performing its operations. The court held that, the expenses 
expended by the taxpayer were not deductible because they were of a capital nature.
131
  
 
In the New State Areas v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,
132
 the taxpayer was a mining company, 
mining in the area where Springs City Council had a right of removing sewage. When waterborne 
sewers were introduced the taxpayer was legally required to connect its premises to the city council 
sewers. The connections were to be installed to the internal premises where the taxpayer had land 
right of conducting its operations and external leading to the municipal sewer connections.
133
  
The municipal council borrowed the taxpayer money for installation of sewer system and recovered 
this from the taxpayer with interest. When the expenses of the sewer system fully paid they become 
the property of the taxpayer, however the externally system will be owned by the municipal 
council.
134
  
It was held that the internal sewers form part of the equipment of the mine after the instalment were 
paid they became the property of the taxpayer. They were thus capital engaged by the taxpayer in 
earning its income. Moreover, the fact that the expenditure is forced by the law does not change its 
character. The external sewers stand on a different footing in that they were not part of the mine. 
They were not constructed in order to improve mining operations and they were not owned by the 
taxpayer. Thus the taxpayer did not acquire any asset or right of any kind.  As a result, expenses for 
external sewers were revenue expenses thus deductible.
135
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The analysis of the above cited cases reveals that the true nature of each expenditure must be 
enquired into. This means considering the entire structure and its operations. The question that must 
be asked is whether the expenses incurred by the taxpayer add or extend the taxpayers income 
earning structure or are they closely related to the taxpayer‟s performance of its operations, the 
former is capital and latter is income. When the expenses are incurred for ensuring that the income 
earning structure is more efficient and continue without any glitches, they are capital. The fact that 
expenses incurred by the taxpayer is by operation of law, does not change the character of the 
expenditure. 
3.6 Damages and Compensation  
 
In the case of Income Tax case no 1279,
136
 it was submitted that, it is not a daunting task to 
determine whether compensation or damages are revenue or capital. The challenge is not a lack of 
the principle, the challenge is fitting the principle to the facts of each case.
137
 Thus if the 
compensation represent the destruction or crippling of the entire taxpayers structure for profit –
making apparatus, which result in the dilution of the capital asset, the proceeds received by the 
taxpayer represent capital.
138
  
 
In the case of WJ Fourier Beleggings v CSARS,
139
 it was submitted that there is a major difference 
between an agreement, which is meant for producing income, and an agreement aimed at 
performance towards making profit, The former is capital and the latter is revenue. In order   for it 
to be capital, it must be part of the taxpayer income producing structure.     
 
In Burmah Steam Ship Co Ltd v IRC,
140
 the taxpayer purchased a second hand vessel. The vessel 
needed a complete overhaul and replacement of engines. A firm of shipbuilders was employed to 
carry out the necessary repairs. In terms of the agreement between the parties is that the repairs 
were to be completed within six months. There were however delays and the work took sixteen 
months to be completed. On account of the delay, the taxpayer claimed a sum equivalent to the 
profit which would have been earned by the vessel if it was trading. The claim was settled by the 
payment of £3,000 by the company that was employed to carry the repairs. The taxpayer received 
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£1,500 and the other £1,500 was received by the British and Burmee Steam Navigation Co. When 
drafting its profit and loss account the taxpayer included the amount and then wrote it off in the 
balance sheet as a special depreciation.
141
  
The issue in this case was whether the amount of £1,500 received from the repairs was a trading 
receipt or damages and as such it should not be taken into account when calculating the profit for 
the purpose of Income Tax.
142
  
 
In making its decision the court said the breach of the agreement cause an injury to the taxpayers 
trading, making a hole in the taxpayers profit and as a result the damages recovered will enter the 
taxpayers‟ profit and loss account for the year. On the other hand if the taxpayers‟ ship was 
negligently run down or sunk by another ship. As a result the taxpayer receive compensation for the 
sunk ship. Such receipt will not be revenue, because the damages received are for the injuries not 
inflicted on the profit, but it is on the capital asset which is the taxpayer trade. The damages are 
made to fill the hole for the loss of sunken vessel, which is an income earning structure. In this case 
the court held that the compensation was received in order to fill a hole in the profit of the taxpayer, 
as such the receipt is revenue.
143
 In Estate Bourke v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,
144
 it was 
held that, “it is only when the payment is received to fill a hole in the capital assets of the taxpayer 
that the payment will escape the tax net”.145  
 
An analysis of the above, suggests that a question of whether a receipt is income or capital is a 
matter of fact that require to be determined on case by case basis. However the central thrust that 
requires determination is - what is the payment is meant to effect? Is the payment filling a hole in 
the pocket of the taxpayer, carrying out a scheme of profit making, extend the taxpayers‟ income-
earning structure or is compensation paid for the diluted income earning structure of the taxpayer? 
As correctly alluded to in the case of Income Tax case no 1279,
146
 it was held that the challenge is 
not a lack of the principle, the challenge is fitting the principle to the facts of each case.
147
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3.7 Are the skills and knowledge of a bride a capital asset to the family of the groom? 
 
In numerous court decisions in South Africa and the United States Supreme Court,
148
 as discussed 
below, it has been argued that “knowledge” and “education” must be regarded as capital in nature.  
In the matter of S v Watermayer,
149
 the case of Commissioner of Taxes v Booysen’s was quoted with 
approval, were the court held that it is not  essential that capital must be in money, because a 
working person‟s capital, can be their ability to work, and the salary is the income.  In the United 
States Supreme Court in the matter of Welch v Helvering,
150
 the court held that “Reputation and 
learning are akin to capital assets, like the goodwill of an old partnership”151.  
 
In the South African context the contrary apply, in Smith v SIR,
152
 it was held that, the phrase 
„capital‟ must be given its ordinary connotation ,which we can infer  to propose every form of 
property used or capable of being used in the production of income or wealth. The expectation is 
that the phrase capital is used in a commercial or corporate sense in order to establish whether the 
expenditure is income or capital. 
  
In the current case the word capital was defined as follows, 
 
“The Court below paraphrased these words as meaning “of a nature akin to that of 
capital”. As a description of the kind of expenditure contemplated that may not be a 
misstatement. The Court, however, applied this meaning, not to the expenditure, but to 
the concept of capital, and found that the “structure” surrounding the appellant‟s 
income-earning capacity is akin to capital, i.e. of a capital nature, and from that premise 
concluded that the expenditure is of a capital nature".
153
 
 
It was further held that it is a normal occurrence to describe personal qualities like, qualification and 
faculties as enhancing the capacity to earn income as capital. As a figure of speech it comes 
naturally to do so, but caution must be exercised, that such is not unduly utilised to blur the precise 
meaning of the phrase capital in the context of the Act. Good health, initiative, tact, a winning 
                                            
148
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149
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personality, can be correctly described as asset in the production of income. It can however not be 
said in a true sense these are capital assets.
154
   
 
 
The above South African court decisions highlight the fact that personal qualities of a person like 
knowledge and learning cannot be regarded as capital asset. This is contrary to a foreign jurisdiction 
case of Welch v Helverling,
155
 were it was held that reputation and learning are a capital asset. The 
South African courts stress the fact that, the phrase capital in nature must be given its ordinary 
meaning as it is understood in the business or commercial world.  
 
 
4. APPLICATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK ON THE NATURE OF A 
LOBOLO PAYMENT  
  
The definition of lobolo in section 1 of the Recognition Act, provides that “lobolo is property in kind 
or in cash, which a prospective husband or  the head of his  family undertakes to  give  to  the  head  
of  the  prospective  wife‟s  family  in  consideration  of  a  customary marriage”. This research 
submit that the definition of lobolo infer that lobolo can be in kind or in any form of property 
corporeal or incorporeal. The definition also postulate the existence of a contract which is known as a 
lobolo contract, between the family of the bride and the groom.  In terms of this agreement 
compensation (lobolo) is received by the family of the bride for the loss of their daughter, assistance, 
production and reproduction.  
 
It is further imperative that in determining whether a lobolo payment is revenue or capital, caution is 
exercised that customary law is not viewed through the lens of common law principles. Ordinary 
principles of customary law must thus be considered in favour of the common law principles. This is 
because the South African Constitution
156
 puts customary law in the same footing with common law. 
In Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others,
157
 it was held that, “while in the 
past indigenous law was seen through the lens of common law, it must now be seen as an integral 
part of our law”.   
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As indicated above, the question of whether a receipt is revenue or capital is a question of fact. The 
Act does not define the phrase of a “capital nature”, however guidelines have been developed over 
the years though court decisions.   
 
One of the guidelines that is utilised in determining whether a receipt is revenue or capital, is 
considering the intention with which the transaction is entered into. The question that needs to be 
asked is, what is the payment is meant to effect? In the case of a lobolo payment, the payment is 
offered in consideration of a marriage. The intention of the parties is thus clear in the case of a lobolo 
payment. However, in the case of CIR v Stott,
158
 the court held that the intention of the taxpayer is a 
significant factor, save if other intervening factors indicates that the article was sold in fulfilment of a 
profit making scheme. In this case it was further emphasised that intention is not the only decisive 
factor that must be taken into account, other factors must also be considered.
159 
 
 
When determining whether the taxpayer is involved in a scheme of profit making or not the inquiry 
considers two questions. The first question is whether the taxpayer objectively conducted business 
and secondly, was it the objective of the taxpayer to conduct business. It is the view of this research 
that lobolo is not a contract of sale,
160
 it is a token of appreciation on the side of the groom‟s family 
to the family of the bride for their care over her. A lobolo payment is thus taken as an economic 
compensation, it is not a business transaction in the scheme of profit making in carrying on of a 
business. Lobolo is received in consideration of a marriage. Lobolo is received by the family of the 
bride as compensation from the family of the groom, for being deprived of her assistance, and her 
family as a result require to be compensated.
161 
  
 
In the matter of CIR V Pick- ‘n-Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust 162 the court highlighted the fact 
that the entire activities of the scheme must to be taken into account when determining whether or not 
a receipt is revenue or capital. In this case the trust was operated under strict rules, which are 
normally not applicable in the normal share-dealing business, the buying and selling of shares was 
not made in relation to market conditions, the trust bought shares, which were forfeited, or shares 
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offered to them by the participants. The trust could only sell the shares to the class of people 
envisaged in the terms of the trust. 
 
This is also the case with a lobolo transaction. Attention must be given to negotiation and the purpose    
thereof in order to understand what they are meant to effect. Furthermore lobolo is not conducted 
within accepted commercial lines in a scheme of or for profit making. It is rather intended to 
conclude a marriage contract, as part of this process compensation is tendered to the family of the 
bride for the loss of their daughter. This principle is highlighted in the case of Commissioner for 
Inland Revenue v Volkswagen of SA (Pty) Ltd,
163
 were it was held that the leasing scheme was not 
considered by the company as a profit making scheme operated in accordance within the accepted 
commercial lines.
 It was rather intended to benefit the taxpayers‟ employees as part of their 
remuneration package.
164
    
 
It is the view of this research that an analysis of the lobolo custom indicates that the loss of a 
daughter is equated to the sterilization of the income earning structure of the family of the bride. This 
is in the form of providing income, emotional support for the groom and his family, giving birth and 
extending the family, or providing manual labour.
165
 This is because the loss of a daughter is 
customarily viewed to create a hole in the family income earning structure in that the family lose her 
production, reproduction and earning capacity. When the family of the groom welcome the bride in 
their family, the bride add or extend their income earning structure, because lobolo serves to 
redistribute both scarce resources and rights over productive resources, land, labour and livestock. 
For the family of the bride this creates a hole in their income earning structure.  The livestock 
received is regarded as filling the hole in the income earning structure. In Burmah Steam Ship Co Ltd 
v IRC,
166
 “it was held that in a case of damages it is essential to consider the hole that is filled in the 
taxpayer‟s pocket. If it is a hole in the profit of the taxpayer it is revenue, if it is compensation for a 
loss of an asset it is capital.
167
 Lobolo is seen as a transfer of wealth between lineages and assignment 
of wealth from the bridegroom and/or his family to the family of the bride. In much of southern, 
central and eastern Africa, lobola was calculated in cattle (even if payment was made in some other 
medium).  
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In customary law a family through the bride is able to gain reproduction and production, this is 
deemed as transfer of wealth. It is thus clear that in customary law “persons” are regarded as an 
integral part in accumulation of wealth, they are viewed a capital asset which makes it possible to 
achieve wealth.  Contrary to this notion in the case of Smith v SIR,
168 
  it was held that good qualities, 
good health and earning capacity are not capital asset.  In was held that, the phrase capital must be 
given its ordinary connotation, which we can infer every form of property used or capable of being 
used in the production of income or wealth. The expectation is that the phrase capital is used in a 
commercial or corporate sense. However according to customary law, reproduction or production is 
regarded as capital asset. As indicated in the case of Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld 
Community and Others,
169
 when dealing with customary law principles, answers must not be sought 
in common law, because common law is not the standard for customary law. Customary law is only 
subject to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
170
 It is the view of this research that 
livestock remain an important sign of wealth in modern South Africa and when livestock is received 
by the bride‟s family for the consideration of a marriage, it is received as compensation that fills a 
hole in the capital structure of the bride‟s family. 171  
 
In customary law if a bride is unable to fulfil her child bearing responsibilities, her father has a moral 
obligation to approach and request to be given a substitute. The substitute can be an unmarried sister 
or a female relative of the sister.
172
 This practise is known as sororate union.  The practise flows from 
the marriage contract entered between the grooms and the brides‟ family. In terms of customary law a 
substitute becomes an additional asset to the house of her sister.
173
 There is no additional lobolo that 
is required because the substitute is regarded as the womb of the original bride. Since, she is a womb 
she is expected to raise the house of the original bride.
174
 The substitute has the rights and duties of 
an ordinary wife, but children borne by the substitute belong to the house of the bride. It is clear that 
the institution of sororate was developed in order to remedy a woman‟s infertility or fill the gap that 
is created by her death.
175
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 It is imperative to also highlight that, it is not the responsibility of the court to establish whether a 
receipt is revenue or capital.  In terms of section 102 of the Tax Administration Act,
176
 the burden of 
proof regarding the rate of tax applicable to a transaction, event or item, rest on the taxpayer. Even 
though the Act is silent on standard of proof that is applicable, it is nevertheless clear that the civil 
standard of proof is applicable. Thus the taxpayer is expected to prove its case on “balance of 
probability”. The burden of proof applies to the question of facts, not on the question of law.177   
 
The question of whether a receipt is revenue or capital is a question of law, which must be decided 
base on the facts of each case.
178
  The assertion is that because the inquiry is on the question of law, 
the onus do not rest on the taxpayer. This is however incorrect because in a number of cases were the 
question was whether proceed is capital or revenue and were the taxpayer was unsuccessful, the court 
has indicated that the taxpayer was unable to discharge the burden of proof.
179
   
 
The view of this research is that an analysis of court decisions suggest that a question of whether a 
receipt is income or capital is a matter of fact that require to be determined on case by case basis. The 
central thrust that needed to be determined is what is a lobolo payment meant to effect? Is the lobolo 
payment filling a hole in the pocket of the bride‟s family or is it a transaction the carrying out a 
scheme of profit making or does a lobolo payment extend the bride‟s family‟ income-earning 
structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. CHAPTER 4: CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
The question of the research was whether a lobolo payment attract tax consequences, if any.  In 
Chapter 1, the research indicated methods that were going to be employed in answering the research 
question. In answering this question books, articles, court decisions and various legislations were 
analysed. 
 
In chapter 2, the research provided an overview of the basic principles. The term customary law, the 
nature of a lobolo payment as well as legislative framework were analysed. In Chapter 2, it was 
established that, for the purposes of this research, a lobolo payment is essentially a compensation 
for loss of a daughter. Furthermore, in order for a receipt of a lobolo payment to be taxable in the 
hands of the brides‟ family, it must meet the requirements as dictated by the definition of gross 
income. In such an event – the receipt of a lobolo payment is taxable.  
 
In chapter 3, the research dealt with the application of legislative framework on the nature of a 
lobolo payment. The research analysed various court decisions with the view of gaining an 
understanding of certain guidelines that are applied by our courts in determining whether a receipt 
is revenue or capital. An analysis of court decisions suggest that a question of whether a receipt is 
income or capital is a matter of fact that require to be determined on case by case basis. The central 
thrust that needed to be determined is - what is a lobolo payment meant to effect? Is the lobolo 
payment filling a hole in the pocket of the taxpayer or is it a transaction in the carrying out a scheme 
of profit making or does a lobolo payment extend the taxpayers‟ income-earning structure.  
 
The conclusion of this research is that a lobolo payment is a receipt of a capital in nature. This 
conclusion is reached on the basis that a lobolo payment is compensation for the loss a daughter, 
which creates a hole in the family income earning structure in that the family lose her production, 
reproduction and earning capacity. When the family of the groom welcome the bride in their family, 
the bride add or extend their income earning structure. This essentially means the bride contribute in 
the form of income, labour and support, all of which is regarded as contributing to the family of the 
groom, therefore seen as extending the income earning structure. 
In considering the metaphor of a tree and a fruit it is the view of this research that the payment of 
lobolo by the family of the groom is meant to compensate the family of the bride, for the important 
limb of the fruit-bearing tree that is chopped. It is further not necessary for the entire income 
- 35 - 
earning structure to be crippled. Chopping off a branch of a fruit-bearing tree is enough to 
immobilise the bride‟s family income earning structure. Lobolo payment is meant to fill the hole in 
the bride‟s family for the chopped branch of a fruit bearing tree.180   
 
It is further the view of this research that the family structure of the groom or the bride‟s family 
cannot be regarded as floating capital, because floating capital is consumed or disappear during the 
processes of production, while fixed capital retain its character and produces fresh wealth.
181
 In the 
case of lobolo it is only the important branch of the fruit bearing that is chopped off. The structure 
does not disappear during the event of lobolo, it is only crippled by the transfer of the bride to the 
family of the groom.   
It is also significance for the purpose of this research to classify the structure of the bride, because 
such structure is the recipient of a lobolo payment. It is further important to indicate that in 
customary law it is the head of the family that administer all property of whatsoever nature acquired 
by an individual or unemancipated member of the family. There is no individual member of the 
family who has a right to own anything, this is a general rule.
182
 
It is also the view of this research that lobolo is not a contract of sale, as  indicated in the case of 
CIR v Pick- ‘n-Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust183 the whole activities of the scheme need to be 
taken into account when determining  whether or not a receipt is revenue or capital. Attention must 
therefore be given to the negotiations and the purpose thereof in order to understand what they are 
meant to effect. Furthermore lobolo is not conducted within accepted commercial lines in a scheme 
of or for profit making. It is rather intended to conclude a marriage contract, as part of this process 
compensation is tendered to the family of the bride for the loss of their daughter.
184
 Lobolo and   its 
legal consequences differs wholly from the common law contract of purchase and sale. The bride is 
not sold merely as a chattel, and the husband cannot resell her as such or destroy her as if she was 
his personal property.
185
 The Recognition Act
186
 further provides that lobolo is a payment for a 
consideration for a marriages. The position that lobolo is not a scheme of or for profit making 
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scheme is also supported by section 211(3) of the Constitution,
187
 which provides that courts must 
apply customary law when that law is applicable. When applying customary law the court must 
consider the Constitution and any relevant legislation dealing with customary law. It is further the 
submission of this research that a lobolo transaction cannot be understood as a scheme of or for 
profit making, because lobolo is not a sale of a bride. Section 2 of the Constitution of the 
Republic
188
 further provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic every law 
must be consistent with the Constitution, this includes customary law, and any law that is deemed 
inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid
189
. 
Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, it is the view of this research that a receipt of a lobola 
payment is considered to be a receipt that is of a capital in nature, and therefore excluded from the 
definition of gross income and ultimately not taxable in the hands of the receiver of thereof. The 
aforesaid only relates to the definition of lobola as quoted in this research. In the event that the 
parties to a lobolo agreement deems a lobolo payment to have a different definition than that is 
stated in this research, the tax effect might be different. This is because customary law is applied 
differently from one tribe to the other in South Africa. In South Africa we have a codified and 
uncodified version of customary law, as a result there is a lack uniformity and certainty in its 
application. It is for this reason that this research submit that in a particular transaction the tax effect 
of lobolo might be different, since this research is based in the codified version of customary law. 
Section 30 of the Constitution further provides that, “everyone has the right to use their own 
language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice, however in exercising these rights 
they may not do so in a manner which is inconsistent with the Constitution”.190 The Constitution 
further permits citizens to interpret and conduct lobolo in accordance with their culture as long as it 
does not violet the rights that are in chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights.
191
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